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Abstract 
 
The introduction of competition has frequently been found to cause costs to fall.  
There has, however, been a question whether this was partly achieved at the cost of 
quality.  Auction theory predicts prices would fall the greater the competition to 
provide the service.  There has been some debate, however, whether the smaller 
budgets would make contract compliance more difficult.  Evidence is found in 
support of this hypothesis.  We also find some evidence that the better recorded 
performance of the in-house DSOs during this period was due to the information  
advantage they had from being incumbents. 
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“The most important question is not the standards that are specified, but the extent to 
which they are being attained.” (Walsh and Davis, Competition and Service, 1993, 
paragraph 12.16) 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Historically it has been common for the public sector in the United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere, to contract out the supply of public works, such as buildings, and supplies, 
such as stationary.  The new Conservative Government of 1979 aimed to extend the 
role of competition and started with the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 
1980 which required local authorities to put all public works above quite low financial 
thresholds out to tender.  This was the beginning of what came to be known as 
compulsory competitive tendering [CCT].  Later initiatives sought to extend the 
principle of competition to services, such as building cleaning, and in this respect the 
United Kingdom was at the forefront. 
 
Central and local government and the National Health Service were all affected.  The 
varieties of arrangements included:  the introduction of quasi-markets, for example, in 
the National Health Service, with health authorities and GP fundholding practices 
purchasing services from NHS hospital trusts (Le Grand and Barlett, 1993; and 
Croxson et al., 2001); and the market testing of ancillary services, such as building 
cleaning and catering, throughout the public sector (Great Britain, 1991).  The 
Conservative Government had several goals when market testing was introduced 
(Ascher, 1987), but there was no presumption that services would be contracted out.  
Similar initiatives have been introduced elsewhere (Domberger and Rimmer, 1994).   
Sturgess et al. (2007a and 2007b) provide a recent comprehensive survey.  
 
A number of studies on the introduction of ‘market testing’, sometimes known as 
‘competitive tendering and competition’, of ancillary services have identified 
significant cost savings when compared with the status quo (Domberger and Jensen, 
1987; Gomez-Lobo and Szymanski, 2001; and Milne and Wright, 2004).  Evidence of 
the effect on service quality has been much more limited. Those studies that do exist 
have typically found mixed results (Domberger and Rimmer, 1994; and Boyne, 1998).  
This study adds to the latter debate, and does so in the context of local government 
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services.  It complements two case studies of the first and second rounds of tendering 
in England, commissioned by the Department of the Environment which was 
responsible for the implementation of compulsory competitive tendering in England.  
They drew on samples of 40 and 38 authorities, respectively, of which 32 were 
common to both (Walsh and Davis, 1993 and Austin Mayhead, 1997, respectively).   
 
Domberger et al. (1995) and Domberger and Li (1995) are rare examples that test the 
joint effect of competition on cost and quality, and are based on a sample of  61 
cleaning contracts in Australia.  They found private tendered contracts cost less than 
their public non-tendered counterparts, “… without adverse effects on quality.”  Their 
conclusions in respect of quality did not go unchallenged (Fraser and Quiggin, 1999; 
and Quiggin, 2000).  One difficulty is the multi-dimensionality of the service 
specification.  Boyne (1998), in his review, draws attention to this, and cites the 
example of studies of refuse collection.  Szymanski (1996) is one such, and models 
costs in terms of the point and frequency of collections; but he is also aware of other 
dimensions.  Comparisons also require each dimension be weighted for an overall 
conclusion to be reached.  This is now standard practice in public sector procurement 
through the use of key performance indicators, but was not at the time market testing 
was introduced.  Alternatively, the weights are implicit in the contract price and, if the 
standards are not met, default procedures can be set in motion.  Ex post contract 
quality is thus a function of its specification and ‘contract compliance’. 
 
Our use of the term ‘contract compliance’ requires some explanation.  The traditional 
American use of this term describes conditions set by the client on a potential 
contractor, for example, on pay and conditions of service.  The term is used here to 
describe whether the service provider has fulfilled the contract’s service specification. 
 
Studies comparing service quality rarely made the distinction between contract 
specification and contract compliance.  Domberger and Hensher (1993), Walsh and 
Davis (1993) and Austin Mayhead (1997) are notable exceptions; but in no case is 
contract compliance modelled in terms of competition for local authority services of 
which we are aware. 
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The purpose of this paper is to test whether competition had an adverse effect on 
contract compliance.  We conclude that it did.  Unlike the majority of studies of 
public sector procurement, impact of competition is not measured in terms of its 
absence or presence so much as of differing degrees of competition.  Rather similar 
results to this study have recently been published for the quasi-market for NHS 
hospital services in England (Propper et al., 2008). 
 
We begin by modelling contract compliance.  We then identify the sample of 
contracts studied.  This is followed by background information on public sector 
procurement, particularly featuring the Local Government Act 1988, so as to put the 
model in context.  The data to be used are then described, to be followed in turn by 
the results of the analysis.  The paper concludes with a discussion. 
 
2 Modelling contract compliance 
Introduction 
 
Recent literature on contracts differentiates ‘classical’ contracts from ‘relational’ 
contracts (Walsh et al., 1997, pp 33-39).  In the case of the former, the terms of the 
contract are clearly defined, performance can be and is monitored and contract failure 
can be and is penalised, even to the extent of contract termination.  The relational 
model is one where these conditions may not all hold or, if they do hold, discretion is 
exercised in the exchange between client and contractor: what might be described as a 
‘partnership’. 
 
In the classical model the contractor’s performance is centre stage, and contract 
failure could be interpreted as the contractor’s inability to live within the agreed price.  
As such, auction theory presents some useful predictions.  In the relational model it is 
the client’s interpretation of contractor performance that is centre stage.  We offer no 
general theory how that discretion might be exercised.  However, the context of this 
study lends itself to some ad hoc predictions that may be tested for their consistency.  
The two models are taken in turn.  The section completes with identifying some 
control variables. 
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Classical contracts and auction theory 
 
The starting point is that the contractor has a set of obligations to be met and a budget 
upon which to draw, both predetermined at the contract’s start.  The contractor bids in 
terms of an expected cost, and the difference between it and the tendered price is the 
expected economic rent earned.  The smaller the expected economic rent, the more 
likely the contractor will cut corners, and therefore be at risk of contract non-
compliance.  What does auction theory have to say about the price tendered?   
 
First, the market testing of local authority ancillary services in the United Kingdom 
was regulated and certain procedures had to be followed.  It conformed to the first-
price sealed-bid type.  Being ‘first-price’, the lowest bid wins the contract, and its 
value is the lowest bid.  We argue in section 4 below that this is what happened for 
the contracts being studied.  Being ‘sealed-bid’, bidders can only guess its value to 
their rivals.  There is a lower limit to ensure any profitability.  To maximize that 
expected profitability the bidder must guess the bid of its most competitive rival, and 
price accordingly.  This is one source of uncertainty.  Offering a lower price reduces 
profit per unit but, by increasing the probability of success, can increase expected 
profit (Milgrom, 1989, pp 11-12).  This extra profit is economic rent.  The larger the 
number of bids, the smaller their dispersion, and hence the smaller the economic rent 
of the winning bid, and the less likely the contract will be compliant.   
 
Second, the model of bidders’ value.  McAfee and McMillan (1988, p 63) argue that 
bidders’ values in government procurement, the subject of this study, be modelled as 
independent-private-value.  They use the following reasoning: 
 
“… each firm knows its own expected cost: a firm that learns about a rival’s 
expected cost may change its strategic behaviour, but it will not change its 
perception of its own expected cost.” 
 
What makes this a model of independent-private-value, is that the value for each 
bidder is known to the bidder, and does not depend on the others’ unknown values.  In 
the model of common-value, in contrast, not only is the value to each bidder not 
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known, but that value is contingent on the values that other bidders put in the auction.  
The danger for bidders is that their value is out of line with others and a loss could be 
incurred, the so-called ‘winner’s curse’.  In practice there is probably an element of 
both independent-private value and common-value. 
 
How important is the choice of model of bidders’ values?  Laffont (1997) finds that, 
for a variety of models, the Bayesian Nash equilibrium winning bid tends to be lower 
the more bids that are tendered.  To that extent, there is no difference between the 
models; and evidence from three sets of public sector contracts which tests the impact 
of the degree of competition on winning bid price supports this prediction (McAfee 
and McMillan, 1988; Gomez-Lobo and Szymanski, 2001; and Milne and Wright, 
2004).1   
 
The functional form, on the other hand, varies with the model; but attempts to 
differentiate bidders’ values this way have been unsuccessful (Brannman et al., 1987; 
and Gilberto and Varaiya, 1989).  For the purposes of this study no particular model is 
assumed.   
 
Third and finally, in the case of asymmetric common-value, better informed bidders 
would earn larger economic rents than their less well-informed competitors.  Laffont 
(1997, p 21) goes so far as to suggest that the expected profits of the uninformed 
bidder would be zero.  If the less well-informed were careful to avoid the winner’s 
curse, the economic rent of the well-informed bidder would be larger still (Whitford, 
2007, pp 72-73).  Incumbents have such an advantage, so that any change of 
contractor puts the new contractor at greater risk of non-compliance.2 
 
To conclude, we hypothesise that the number of bids and asymmetric information 
both influence how much economic rent contractors can earn, and hence their 
                                                 
1 However, as one of the referees notes, in certain circumstances increasing the number of bids might 
raise the winning bid (Riley and Samuelson, 1981).  Assuming, as we do, that the winning bid is 
positively correlated with compliance – that is the higher the winning bid the greater the compliance – 
then a quite different outcome is predicted from the one hypothesised by us: namely, that greater 
competition would increase compliance.   
 
2 Apart from auction theory, the existence of sunk costs, for whatever reason, would favour incumbents 
when contract go out to tender (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988, pp 112-3). 
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likelihood of being contract compliant.  Compliance is predicted to be less common 
the more bids there are and to be more common when incumbents retain the contract.  
 
Relational contracts and client discretion 
 
Relational contracts arise if clients are unable to enforce the terms of the contract for 
some reason, or choose not to do so.  In the context of this study, they refer to 
repeated interactions over the life of the contract between the authority (the principal) 
and the agent (whether DSO or private contractor), whose outcome is reported 
compliance.  Some knowledge of the particulars of the markets studied is therefore 
necessary to see the possibilities for relational contracts.  The brief discussion given 
here is followed up in more detail in section 4 below. 
 
The model is tested on contracts for the services covered by the Local Government 
Act, 1988 which made competitive tendering compulsory for all local authorities in 
Great Britain for a specified range of ‘identified activities’ over a defined period.  
Typically, the activities had previously been produced in-house by direct service 
organisations [DSOs] or direct labour organisations [DLOs], both referred to 
subsequently as DSOs.  The Act allowed continued in-house production for a 
predetermined period, but only after the DSO had demonstrated its cost effectiveness 
against external competition.   
 
From its very beginning the Local Government Act 1988 drew upon lessons on the 
award of contracts that had been learnt from the implementation of the Local 
Government, Planning  and Land Act 1980.  Strict procedures were laid down to 
prevent both ‘anti-competitive behaviour’ and the introduction of non-commercial 
considerations which might bias the client authority in favour of awarding the contract 
to DSOs. Commercial contractors continued to complain to the Department of 
Environment; but, as is noted later, in most cases the complaints were not accepted. 
 
The situation in respect of the monitoring of contracts, the subject of this study, was 
different.  The original 1988 Act was silent on this matter, though it was addressed 
subsequently, as we show later in this paper.  Suffice it to note that Walsh and Davis 
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(1993, tables 10.4, 10.8 and 10.20) found DSOs were more compliant in the first 
round of tendering, using a variety of measures.  They also noted this could be partly 
explained by the mix of activities that were perhaps less at risk of non-compliance.    
DSOs continued to be more compliant in the second round (Austin Mayhead, 1997, 
table 4.8).  Private contractors complained client authorities were biased, but Austin 
Mayhead (1997, para 4.8.3) found “no … evidence … to support or refute these 
views.”  Had they been justified, this study would find DSOs more compliant. 
 
The title ‘DSO’ not only describes ownership, but a particular type of public 
ownership, sometimes described as ‘hybrid’ organisations (Vincent-Jones and 
Harries, 1996a).  Having submitted a bid and won the contract, the DSO no longer 
had the full support of its parent authority, nor had it the full independence of a 
contractor.  Instead the DSOs were tied to predetermined budgets, had to achieve a 
target real rate of return [of 5%, subsequently changed to 6%, on ‘net assets’, with the 
two exceptions of building cleaning and the management of sports and leisure 
facilities which was required only to break-even (Department of the Environment, 
1994, para 7)].  Sometimes the relationship between the hybrid DSO and its client 
(parent) authority was fraught, as is recognised in the ‘hard split’, ’soft split’ 
distinction.  ‘Hard split’ denotes the physical separation of staff employed in DSO 
units from former colleagues, now responsible for monitoring its performance; ‘soft 
split’ denotes  their close proximity.  Several case studies found hard split 
arrangements “conflictual and antagonistic” (Shaw et al., 1994, p 208, italics in the 
original).  See also Vincent-Jones & Harries (1996a and 1996b).  Soft split 
arrangements were generally more harmonious.  On the basis of these studies we 
would expect contracts run by ‘soft split’ authorities to be more compliant.   
 
Completing the model 
 
A number of control variables are included: first, the type of activity, such as building 
cleaning; second, the first year real value of the contract; and third, contract duration.  
It would be surprising if recorded compliance were the same for the different 
activities given the potential for differences in the contract specification, its 
monitoring and the imposition of penalties.  Contract value is an instrument for the 
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size and complexity of the contract, but we have no a priori view of their combined 
impact on compliance.  Its value is the outcome of the tendering process and, to that 
extent, a negative correlation between the extent of competition and contract value 
may be expected.  We assume contract value to be exogenous with respect to 
compliance: certainly, in terms of the sequence of events, compliance follows from 
the degree of competition and the value of contract; it does not precede them.  Finally, 
we test the robustness of our results for changes over time and regional differences.   
 
Lack of information prevents us from testing whether the DSO was run under a ‘hard’ 
or ‘soft’ split arrangement, as suggested by the case study material cited above.  The 
omission may not be material, given that Austin Mayhead (1997, table 9.4) found the 
overwhelming majority of blue-collar contracts – those studied here - were ‘hard’ split 
in the second round of tendering.  
 
3 Sample studied 
 
Seven activities were initially covered by the Local Government Act, 1988: refuse 
collection, building cleaning, other cleaning (including street cleansing), catering 
(education and welfare), other catering, vehicle maintenance and ground maintenance.  
The management of sports and leisure facilities was added very shortly afterwards by 
Statutory Instrument.  Others activities were added some years later, also by Statutory 
Instruments, but are not considered for inclusion because of the short history of their 
experience of CCT. 
 
Catering is excluded from this study because of the difficulty predicting its economic 
rent.  This can be best understood in terms of hospital catering, admittedly not the 
subject of study here.  The client authority would put the provision of patient meals 
out to tender, for which the authority would pay.  Staff meals, for example for doctors 
and nurses, could also be provided by the same supplier; but in this case the staff 
would pay and they would be a source of additional income for the provider.  Staff 
meals could be so profitable that the contractor might even be willing to provide 
patient meals at a loss.  In the local authority catering context, staff catering and its 
income generating prospects are likely to be much more important.  Sports and leisure 
management is also excluded because the contract was for the management of the 
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service, not the provision of the service itself.  The study concentrates on the 
remaining five activities.   
 
4 The Local Government Act 1988: the process of public procurement and 
monitoring 
 
This background to our study of the 1988 Act is divided into three parts.  In the first 
part we recognise that there was already a history of public procurement in local 
government, and that existing arrangements were adapted and did not require 
legislation for their introduction.  In the second part the arrangements of the 1988 Act 
and its accompanying statutory measures and guidance at its start are described.  The 
final part identifies some of the key developments over the life time of the Act.  The 
intention of this section is to provide background information on the effect of 
competition on contract compliance.  The topics chosen and details given put 
competition in the context of auction theory, and contract compliance in terms of 
conforming to its specification.  The information is limited to the five activities that 
constitute our sample and largely addresses the English experience.  We refer to the 
few major departures in Wales and Scotland in the historic narrative. 
 
The background to the 1988 Act 
 
Local government already had a history of public procurement for capital projects and 
supplies in 1988, and procedures were in place to satisfy their fiduciary duty.  It 
would not have been difficult to adapt them to the requirements of the 1988 Act, and 
what is described below largely stands apart from the 1988 Act which was directed at 
the public procurement of services.  In terms of competition and contract compliance, 
we look at the award of contracts, selected characteristics of contracts, and the 
monitoring and default procedures used to ensure compliance.   
 
We start with the process of awarding contracts.   In terms of competition and auction 
theory, one of the first steps is the notification of the contract being put out to tender.  
This might be by advertisement or by reference to some list of approved contractors.  
Interested contractors could follow up, and would be sent a detailed specification by 
the local authority and be asked to complete a questionnaire to cover a wide range of 
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issues: for example, the firm’s financial viability and technical competence.  Armed 
with more detailed information about the activity being put out to tender, the 
contractor could choose to complete the questionnaire.  With this information the 
local authority’s evaluation panel would decide which ones to invite to tender.  
Invited contractors who were still interested could then decide to bid.   
 
The data collected and subsequently analysed in this paper give some idea of the 
interest in tendering for the five activities studied.  For each contract awarded, the 
average number of contractors (including DSOs) applying for a questionnaire was 
16.6; the average number of questionnaires completed was 12.6; the average number 
of invitations to tender was 6.5; and the average number of bids submitted [‘Tenders’ 
in the model] was 2.8. 
 
The contract’s evaluation team would check the bids submitted had been properly 
priced and were technically feasible.  Representatives of the DSO and contractors 
would be interviewed for further information and to seek assurances.  The team would 
be interested in the intended rates of pay and conditions of service, with the retention 
and recruitment of suitable staff in mind.  Work study would often have been used to 
assess whether the resources indicated were sufficient: expecting staff to work close 
to 100% performance, or even faster, would have required appropriate contract 
supervision and management, and might be considered to have left too small a margin 
for absenteeism and so create too great a risk of contract failure.  These factors might 
have been considered by the team as sufficient to reject the bid even if it were lower, 
knowing that this decision would have to have been justified if it favoured the DSO 
over a contractor (Department of the Environment, 1988, para 33).  The aim of the 
team was to identify the best priced tender which was likely to be contract compliant. 
 
More recent experience of Private Finance Initiatives in Britain has given rise to the 
idea of selecting a preferred bidder, to be followed by a process of negotiation before 
the award of the contract.  This is not what happened under CCT.  Negotiation after 
the bids had been submitted was only permitted if all others who had submitted 
compliant bids were given the same opportunity (Department of the Environment, 
1993a, paras 36-8).  The notion of ‘preferred bidder’ did not apply then. 
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In the case of the services studied, fixed price would be the norm.  How the price was 
set would depend on the circumstances.  If the workload could be anticipated, such as 
for building cleaning, then the various elements of the specification would be priced 
and a total cost/total price be submitted.  If the workload could not so easily be 
anticipated, such as for vehicle maintenance, then bills of quantities would be priced 
for the range of services put out to tender and, with projections for anticipated 
workload, a total cost/price be submitted, with variations if the actual workload 
differed from the anticipated workload by more than given margin.  Contracts usually 
lasted at least three years and would have included variations in prices due to 
inflation, and in the total cost due to changes to the specification, as for example from 
the closure or opening of buildings during the life of the contract.   
 
The passage of the 1988 Act meant that it was usually the first time the identified 
activities had been given a clear specification (Walsh and Davis, 1993, para 12.1).  
The beginning, therefore, was something of a learning process for local authorities, 
and the natural response was to rehearse on paper what had been done previously and 
the way it had been done.  This meant in practice that specifications tended to be input 
based.  Thus for building cleaning contracts, for each of the premises, a view might be 
taken of the type and frequency of cleaning and the standard expected.  All three 
parameters could be varied according to the quality of cleaning required.  To that 
extent, the quality of the service could be defined by the specification.  This was the 
firm expectation of central government until quite late in the history of CCT 
(Department of the Environment, 1996a, paras 19-20 and 24); and it seems to have 
been largely accepted by local authorities (Austin Mayhead, 1997, para 4.1.4).  The 
evaluation team thus had no need to balance price against quality of service.  What it 
had to do was find the best priced quality compliant bid.  If the price was well below 
what had been expected, well and good.  If the price was well above what had been 
expected, then it might have been necessary to re-negotiate the contract, or put it out 
to tender using a new specification. 
 
There would also have been a learning process in the monitoring of contracts and 
imposition of penalties.  However, the commitment implied by contracts lasting at 
least three years gave all parties an incentive to come to some kind of 
accommodation.  Furthermore, any contractor interested in expansion  would want to 
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secure good references.  Over the longer term some industry bodies, such as the 
British Institute of Cleaning Science, would also develop guides to standards, 
specifications and productivity rates and so reduce the margin of uncertainty in the 
bargaining between contractors and clients. 
 
Later in the history of CCT, the Department of the Environment (1996a, paras 17-8) 
encouraged local authorities to think more in terms of output based specifications.  No 
examples were given, but some idea can be obtained in the case of, say, refuse 
collection.  The specification might indicate a weekly domestic collection, 
accompanied by a list of the dwellings and streets to be covered.  The contractor 
would be free to decide what kind of bins be used and how the collection be 
organised.  Output based specifications, such as this one, promise to be no more 
difficult to monitor and apply default procedures to than input based specifications.   
 
 
The 1988 Act and the consequential legislation and guidance 
 
One major purpose of the 1988 Act was to ensure that testing the efficiency of DSO 
provision was extended to (manual) services.  Another purpose was to built upon the 
strengths of the Local Government, Planning and Land Act 1980, and correct some of 
its perceived shortcomings, one of which was its failure to address ‘anti-competitive 
behaviour’ by some local authorities.  The 1988 Act was therefore quite prescriptive 
about the process of procurement, and made certain requirements of local authorities.  
The Act was followed by a succession of Statutory Instruments, which had equal 
legislative force.  The central government departments, responsible for the 
implementation of the Act, also issued a series of circulars to local authorities, whose 
purpose was to explain the legislative measures and give guidance on its 
implementation.  Local authorities were consulted prior to Parliament’s passage of the 
Statutory Instruments and the Departments’ publication of circulars.  We identify just 
some of the features of the legislation and advice on procurement and the monitoring 
of contracts when the 1988 Act first come into force.  Those interested in learning 
more are referred to Cirell and Bennett (1990) and its subsequent updates.  Typically 
the features applied equally to all ‘identified activities’.   
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Two novel features of the 1988 Act come in Sections 7 and 17.  Neither section is 
comprehensive in definition; but their clear purpose was to prevent local authorities 
from putting contractors at a disadvantage compared to the DSO, or otherwise 
discourage contractors from bidding.  Examples were given to illustrate both.  Section 
7 addressed ‘anti-competitive behaviour’ by local authorities.  They were required to 
advertise the contract “… in at least one newspaper circulating in the locality in which 
the work is to be carried out and at least one publication circulating among persons 
who carry out work of the kind concerned …” (Local Government Act, 1988, s 7(1)).  
Further, local authorities were also required to invite a minimum of three (external) 
contractors, if that number presented (Local Government Act, 1988, s 7(4)(a)).  
Section 17 addressed ‘non-commercial considerations’, and prevented local 
authorities from imposing conditions on contractors, for example, “… the terms and 
conditions of employment …” (Local Government Act, 1988, s 17(5)(a)).   
 
The 1988 Act also indicated DSOs have financial objectives “… as the Secretary of 
State thinks fit.” (Local Government Act, 1988, s 10(4)).  The objective matched that 
currently applied to the 1980 Act and was set at 5% rate of return, with building 
cleaning exempt and required only to break even (Department of the Environment, 
1988, paras 42-7). 
 
Local authorities found to have acted anti-competitively or whose DSO failed to meet 
its financial objective could have been asked to take remedial action, and even be 
required to put the contract out to tender again (Local Government Act, 1988, 
Sections 13 and 14).  In fact, the Department of the Environment found little evidence 
of anti-competitive behaviour; and, although it was not uncommon for DSOs to fall 
short of their financial objective, it was not common for the parent local authority to 
have to gone beyond the remedial measures it had already taken (Department of the 
Environment, 1996b, pp 13-4). 
   
Statutory Instruments were used to define what was to be included within each of the 
‘identified activities’, the timetable for the first round of tendering, the duration of 
contracts, and exemptions.  The timetable was designed to avoid the chaotic 
experience of market testing of similar services in the NHS in the mid 1980s, and 
each local authority was given its own timetable for implementation for each of the 
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activities.  The first round  for four of the five activities for local authorities as a group 
started in August 1989 and was due for completion in January 1992 (LGMB, 1991, 
Appendix 2).  As an example, the London borough of Islington had to have its 
building cleaning contract(s) start by 1 August 1989.  Ground maintenance was 
treated differently, with all authorities having the same timetable, but required to put 
it out to tender in five annual tranches: 20% by 1 January 1990, 20% by 1 January 
1991, and so on.  Contract duration was given minimum and maximum lengths, that 
were activity specific, and also depended on whether or not the contract was wholly 
or mainly for educational establishments.  Only activities whose value in the previous 
financial year exceeded £100,000 had to be put out to tender – the so-called de 
minimis threshold - and the whole activity had to be put out to tender.  Local 
authorities were free to retain those smaller as an in-house service.   
 
The Department circulars rehearsed many of the above statutory requirements, but 
they also included advice and guidance gained from the implementation of CCT.  
Issues covered related to the  terms of the contracts, for example, the use of 
performance bonds and default procedures, and the evaluation of bids, for example, 
what should and should not be included when comparing the DSO with contractors.  
No attempt is made here at looking at developments of this mixed bunch of features 
over the life time of CCT.  However, of particular significance to the topic of this 
paper are the importance of price and quality in the award of contracts and the 
packaging/bundling of contracts.  As noted above, right from the start local authorities 
had to have ‘good reason’ to favour the DSO bid over lower priced tenders from 
contractors (Department of the Environment, 1988, para 33).  Failure to provide ‘good 
reason’ could result in the charge of anti-competitive behaviour and a fresh tendering 
exercise.  This is discussed as part of the next topic.  
 
The above arrangements for England applied in equal force in Wales and Scotland.  
The Welsh Office administered CCT in Wales; and the Scottish Office, to be 
succeeded by the Scottish Government on devolution, administered CCT in Scotland.  
 
An historic narrative of the 1988 Act 
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In the two preceding sub-sections we identified various characteristics of public 
procurement and the monitoring of contracts we thought could inform the effect of 
competition on contract compliance.  In the immediately preceding sub-section we 
focussed on the Local Government Act 1988 at it start.   In this sub-section we 
identify some of the changes to the Act over its life time, taking a chronological 
approach.   
 
First, although attention was given to ‘anti-competitive’ behaviour by local authorities 
in the original legislation as it affected the evaluation of bids and the award of 
contracts, it was silent on their monitoring.  This was remedied when new guidance 
was issued in1991 (Department of the Environment, 1991), drawing upon the 
experience of the first round of tendering.  Local authorities were now required to 
apply the same default clauses and default points systems equally to DSOs as to 
contractors, and that they reflect a “… genuine pre-estimate of the additional costs 
…” (Ibid, para 37).  In 1996 the Department of the Environment (1996a, para 29) 
noted: “Any default process should, where practical, allow the contractor [including 
DSOs] to remedy any default …” (parenthesis inserted). 
 
Second, in the original legislation local authorities were required to invite a minimum 
of three contractors – ie not including the DSO - to bid for contracts, if that number 
presented.  In 1991 this threshold was raised to from four to six, depending on the size 
of the contract (Department of the Environment, 1991, para 33).  This guidance did 
not have a statutory basis.  Related to this is the generation of contractor interest in 
tendering.  Except for ground maintenance, activities could be put out to tender as a 
single contract.  On this basis, most firms that might have been interested in tendering 
would have been too small to compete.  Local authorities were therefore encouraged 
to be open to packaging district wide contracts, and “… seek the views of the relevant 
trade associations on the kind of packaging which is most common in that industry.” 
(Department of the Environment, 1991, para 28).   
 
Third, the European Union’s Procurement Directives were extended to include 
services, and came into force in January 1994.  Public sector contracts for certain 
services had to follow a set of prescribed procedures, resulting in some modification 
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to those appearing in the 1988 Act.  One in particular was the publication of contracts 
in the Official Journal of the European Community.   
 
The Directive was also prescriptive in respect of the process of awarding contracts.  
Two features of particular interest to this study are the selection of firms invited to bid 
and the evaluation of bids submitted.  In the former case the local authority’s selection 
of firms could variously be open, restricted or negotiated.  In Britain the ‘restricted’ 
option has generally been preferred (Department of the Environment, 1973), and 
probably did not deviate from customary practice.  In the latter case there has been a 
choice between lowest price and ‘most economically advantageous’, which gives 
scope for value for money.  In Britain the latter has generally been preferred 
(Hansard, 26 April 1999, w 19).  By this time the Department of the Environment had 
accepted that quality sometimes could not be fully specified in the contract, and that 
some weight should therefore be given to other considerations than price.  Austin 
Mayhead (1997, table 5.13) in the context of blue collar activities, found that 91% of 
contracts were awarded to the lowest bid in the first round of tendering, and 85% in 
the second round.  In several cases the lowest rejected bid benefitted contractors, so 
the issue of ‘anti-competitive behaviour’ would not have arisen.  Quite likely the 
rejection arose from concerns by the evaluation teams that the rejected bids were 
under-resourced and likely to be non-compliant.   
 
At its start the Directive’s threshold for its application was ECU 200,000, equivalent 
to £141,000 (Office of Public Service and Science, 1993a, para E8).  Given the 1988 
Act threshold of £100,000 per annum and that contracts generally lasted at least three 
years, then activities covered by the 1988 Act were potentially also covered by the 
Services Procurement Directive.  Of the five services studied, only ground 
maintenance was not covered by the Services Procurement Directive (Department of 
the Environment, 1993b, pp 5-6).  
 
The fourth change came as a consequence of another European Union Directive, the 
Acquired Rights Directive of 1977.  The Directive created three issues of particular 
interest to this study.  The first relates to its application to local authority contracts.  
After some delay the Directive became part of UK law in 1981 under the Transfer of  
Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations [TUPE], and was conceived 
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by the British government of the time to apply only to commercial, ie non-
governmental undertakings.  This was not the original intention of the Directive, and 
there was a period of considerable uncertainty about its application to local authority 
(and National Health Service) contracts in the early 1990s: see, for example, (Office 
of Public Service and Science, 1993b).  It was only some time later that Cirrel and 
Bennett (1998, para 19.17) concluded: “Most contractors now accept that, for blue 
collar CCT at least TUPE will virtually always apply …”.   This extended period of 
legal uncertainty is likely to have deterred both local authorities from putting the 
activities out for retender sooner than they had to, and firms from tendering.   
 
The two other issues arise from TUPE and the protection given to employees’ wages 
and conditions of service on the transfer of the undertaking.3  First, the Directive has 
limited the ability of contractors to compete with the incumbent (DSO or contractor) 
on price, and thus frustrated one of the key elements of the 1988 Act noted above in 
the context of ‘non-commercial considerations’.  And second, an inevitable 
consequence was that incumbent firms have had to disclose to potential competitors 
the numbers of staff that would be affected by the transfer and their terms and 
conditions of service, thus reducing the asymmetric advantage incumbency has given 
them over their competitors. 
 
The fifth change was to the duration of contracts.  A Statutory Instrument increased 
the minimum and maximum durations for some activities in October 1995. 
  
The sixth event of some potential significance was local government reorganisation to 
create unitary local authorities on a selective basis in England.  Some reorganisation 
had already taken place in 1986, with the establishment of London Boroughs and 
Metropolitan Districts.  The 1992 Local Government Act sought to extend this, and 
reorganisation was carried out over four successive annual waves, starting in April 
1995 and ending in April 1998.  The consequence was that contracts that were due for 
renewal by local authorities that were subject to reorganisation were extended until 
                                                 
3 The Department of the Environment (1995) advised local authorities that,  quite apart from the 
Directive, in pension arrangements are a condition of service, and comparable provision should be 
made on transfer.. 
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well after the reorganisation had been implemented.  The London Boroughs and 
Metropolitan Districts, of course, were not affected.   
 
The seventh and final event was the election of New Labour in May 1997.  New 
Labour was committed to end CCT and replace it by ‘Best Value’.  Under Best Value, 
market testing still had a part to play, but it would no longer be automatically 
compulsory.  Other contractual arrangements were to be encouraged, and compulsion 
was seen as a last resort if other measures failed  (Davis and Walker, 1998).  It was 
not until January 2000 that the original legislation was repealed in England and Wales 
through the Local Government Act, 1999.  Until then, New Labour introduced Best 
Value through a series of pilot projects proposed by some of the local authorities; 
other local authorities experienced only minor changes to the Conservative legislation 
already in place.  One such change was the raising of the threshold for mandatory 
market testing from £100,000 in nominal prices to £150,000 in April 1998. 
 
This ends our narrative for England.  We turn now, briefly, to the very few major 
differences in Wales and Scotland.  These arose from the reorganisation of local 
government and the election of New Labour. 
 
In the case of reorganisation, unitary authorities were established for all local 
authorities in both countries from 1 April 1996.  In anticipation of this, there was a 
moratorium on CCT from 1 April 1994 in Wales and 1 April 1995 in Scotland.  As 
will be evident, this marked the end of CCT in these two countries for these five 
activities. 
 
In the case of the election of New Labour, the two countries took forward the 
replacement of CCT by Best Value on a more informal basis, and CCT was 
effectively dropped until the rescinding of the relevant legislation: the Local 
Government Act 1999 in the case of Wales; and the Scottish Parliament’s Local 
Government in Scotland Act 2003. 
 
5 Data and descriptive statistics 
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The implementation of CCT by local authorities was closely monitored by the 
constituent central government departments but, otherwise, information of contracts 
was not collected centrally.  Instead, the local authorities in England and Wales, 
initially through the Local Government Training Board and later through the Local 
Government Management Board, maintained a database of contracts of their own.  
The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities performed a similar role in Scotland; 
and in 1993 these two sources were combined.  Starting in April 1990, periodical 
reports were published which central government,4 amongst others, used as a source 
of information at the national level.  This study draws upon the original data base and 
refers to contracts awarded. 
 
Participation by member local authorities was voluntary, but the opportunity to share 
their experience was the incentive to take part and, as far as one can tell, coverage was 
largely complete.  Even at the later stages, when the continuance of CCT was very 
much in doubt, more than ninety percent of participating local authorities continued to 
take part (Horwood, 2002).  However, routine information was provided on only 
select questions, and this limits the size of the sample that could be included in this 
study.  Although CCT did not start in earnest until 1989, the Local Government 
Training Board collected information on contracts which had started earlier, and are 
included in the analysis.  Information on these few early starters was likely supplied 
some time after their start, unlike the information on later contracts.  
 
Our dataset covers 1363 contracts for which we have information on our measures of 
competition and contract compliance. Data are available for contracts starting from 
1986, before the implementation of the CCT legislation, and continuing to those 
starting in 2000, shortly before the repeal of the relevant legislation. As we mentioned 
above, our analysis covers the five activities for which the theoretical mechanisms 
stressed seem to be most relevant: Ground maintenance, Building cleaning, Vehicle 
maintenance, Street (and other) cleaning, and Refuse collection. The number of 
contracts awarded each year to these five activities is given in table 1. 
 
[Insert table 1] 
                                                 
4 For example, see Department of the Environment (1996b). 
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Our measurement of contract compliance is based on a seven point scale, and was part 
of a questionnaire issued periodically to local authorities.  In several but not in all 
respects the scale is an unambiguous record of default measures taken.  However, as 
was indicated in the context of relational contracts, authorities have discretion in 
setting the specification, monitoring performance and imposing penalties in the case 
of default.  So, had the authority chosen the relational contractual route, the outcome 
measure would have had a subjective element.  The data refer largely to a snapshot at 
some point in the life of the contract.  Information was collected for 29% of the 
contracts over the period 1986-2000 (see table 1).  
 
Authorities were asked to rank contracts in terms of compliance, with answers 
varying from best [‘No problems’] to worst [‘Contract terminated’]. Table 2 gives all 
seven available answers and their frequency across all completed questionnaires. As 
can be noticed, each of the first four possible answers contains a sizeable share of the 
total observations – from 17% to 36%. The last three answers, on the other hand, are 
very rarely chosen: each of them constitutes about 1% of all answers. Based on these 
answers we construct a measure of contract compliance where higher values denote 
better compliance. We assign to the first three answers of the questionnaire (a, b and 
c) the values of 4, 3 and 2, while the value of 1 will be reserved for the last four 
answers of the questionnaire (d to g) and corresponds to the cases with most problems 
of compliance.     
 
[Insert table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents the distribution of our measure of compliance for each of the five 
activities we consider. For the 1363 contracts on which we base our empirical 
analysis, 24.9% of cases register a value of 4 (“No problem”), 36.7% a value of 3 
(“minor warnings”), 18.6% a value of 2 (“default notices but no damages/payments 
withheld”) and 19.7% have a value of 1 and encountered more serious problems. This 
distribution is reproduced quite closely for the three activities of Ground maintenance 
(almost half of the sample); Street cleaning and Refuse collection. Building cleaning, 
on the other hand, had a considerably worst compliance record than the average; 
while Vehicle maintenance had a considerably better one. This ranking is consistent 
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with the experience of England during the first round of tendering (Walsh and Davis, 
1993, table 10.3).  Curiously, questionnaires were most commonly completed for 
building cleaning – indeed for all identified building cleaning contracts - and least 
commonly (14%) for vehicle maintenance contracts.  So part of the variation of 
compliance by activity may reflect the willingness of authorities to complete the 
questionnaires.  
 
[Insert table 3] 
 
Our measure of competition is the number of bids tendered for each contract, a 
variable that we refer to as Tenders. A larger number of tenders imply a higher degree 
of competition to be awarded the contract. Following our previous discussion, we 
hypothesize that more competition may result in underbidding and in a lower 
likelihood of compliance, in other words we expect the coefficient of Tenders to be 
negative. Tenders will be initially assumed to be exogenous, but the possibility of 
endogeneity will be explicitly addressed in the next section. 
 
Figure 1 presents a histogram of Tenders. About 10% of contracts received only 1 bid, 
in which case the degree of competition was arguably minimal. The mode of the 
distribution is for the case of 3 tenders, and the frequency decreases after this value. 
Although the maximum number of bids we have recorded in our sample is 32, 
observations with more than 10 bids are very rare and constitute about 3% of our 
sample. 
 
[Insert figure 1] 
 
The bivariate relationship between Tenders and Compliance is shown in table 4, 
which calculates the average value of Compliance for each number of tenders. No 
trend in Compliance can be detected when passing from 1 to 5 tenders, with an 
average value fluctuating around 2.75. Between 5 and 9 tenders, however, there is a 
noticeable trend towards lower values of Compliance, which reaches an average of 
2.12 for 9 tenders. Within this range Tenders had the expected effect.  The difference 
in average compliance between 5 and 9 tenders is 0.63, which is a large change when 
we consider that the standard deviation of our compliance measure is 1.07.  
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From 10 tenders upwards we observe a change of trend towards lower values of 
compliance. Although this concerns only a small part of our total observations, we 
will study the possibility of non-linearities in the relationship between competition 
and compliance in our empirical analysis.  
 
[Insert table 4] 
 
Auction theory also predicts that incumbents have an advantage due to asymmetric 
information, and so we would expect incumbents to be more compliant than non-
incumbents. The database does not allow us to identify all incumbents because 
winning firms are characterized simply as a DSO or as a private contractor. Thus, if 
we observe that a contract formerly in the hands of a private contractor is now given 
to a private contractor we have no way of knowing whether the new winner is the 
incumbent or not. On the other hand, if the contract is given to a DSO the first time it 
is offered then we know we are facing a situation where the incumbent has won. It 
follows that the effect of incumbency can be estimated at least partially by comparing 
contracts won by incumbent DSOs to contracts won by non-incumbent DSOs (that is, 
where the contract was previously held by a private contractor).  
 
We create two dummy variables to identify these two cases and compare their 
coefficients. If information asymmetries imply better compliance for the more 
informed party, we would expect the coefficient of incumbent DSOs to be larger than 
the coefficient of non-incumbent DSOs. 
 
Besides tenders and dummies for incumbent and non-incumbent DSOs, we consider a 
set of control variables in accordance with our previous discussion regarding different 
determinants of contract compliance. First, we control for the value of the contract - 
measured in £s at 2000 prices by means of a public sector GDP deflator - and the 
duration of the contract in years. The year in which the contract started is controlled 
for by the use of time dummies. We include dummy variables for each economic 
region of England plus Scotland and Wales (with London as the excluded category). 
Finally, we use dummy variables for each of the five selected activities and the 
squared number of tenders to look for non-linearities.  
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Table 5 offers summary statistics for the main variables used in our regressions. 
 
[Insert table 5] 
 
6 Empirical analysis 
 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we derive our main results using simple 
OLS focusing on the role of tenders on compliance and discussing how different 
controls may affect this relationship. We then repeat the exercise under the 
assumption that our dependent variable, compliance, offers only an ordinal rank of 
outcomes. Regression analysis using ordered probit would thus be adequate for this 
type of variable. Finally, we pay attention to the potential endogeneity of our 
dependent variable and estimate our results using an instrumental variable approach. 
 
OLS regressions 
 
Our empirical specification is as follows: 
 
Compliance = α + βTenders + ΓX + ε     [1] 
 
Where Compliance and Tenders are as discussed above, X is a set of control 
variables, and α, β and Γ denote coefficients to be estimated. The model thus assumes 
that Compliance is a cardinal measure taking discrete values between 1 and 4. The 
difference between any two contiguous values is assumed to be equal. 
 
Results are presented in table 6. Column 1 is our baseline regression, and includes as 
a set of standard control variables the Contract Value, Contract Duration, Time and 
Region dummies. The coefficient on Tenders is negative, statistically significant and 
has a value of -0.038. We also note that larger contracts – as measured by the log of 
their value – tend to have more problems of compliance and that longer contract 
duration is associated with better compliance. 
 
[Insert table 6] 
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The coefficient of Tenders may suffer from omitted variable bias for a number of 
reasons that we address in turn. First, some of the activities under consideration may 
be inherently more problematic and, at the same time, be characterized by higher 
competition. To make sure that Tenders is not just picking up these differences we 
introduce dummy variables for the activities of Building cleaning, Vehicle 
maintenance, Street (and other) cleaning and Refuse collection. Ground maintenance, 
the largest activity by number of observations, is our excluded category.  
 
Column 2 shows that the coefficient on Tenders is somewhat smaller after this change 
(-0.030) but remains clearly statistically significant. In accordance with the data from 
table 3, Building cleaning has a considerably worse record of compliance than the rest 
while Vehicle maintenance is noticeably less problematic. 
 
Next we turn to the investigation of the effects of asymmetric information by 
including the dummies for incumbent and non-incumbent DSOs discussed before. 
Besides being important in their own right, these variables eliminate another source of 
potential omitted variable bias since DSOs were much more likely to win bids in 
which few tenders were present. Thus, the negative coefficient on Tenders from the 
previous two regressions may just be picking up the effect that more tenders imply a 
lower likelihood of a DSO being awarded the contract. 
 
Results are reported in column 3 and support the hypothesis that information 
asymmetries increase the likelihood of compliance for the more informed bidders. 
The coefficient on incumbent DSOs is positive and statistically significant, implying a 
better compliance record for them, while the effect is negative and non-significant for 
non-incumbent DSOs. The difference between the two coefficients is large (0.278), 
but an F-test for the equality between them cannot reject the null hypothesis (p-value 
of 0.177). We note, however, that the number of non-incumbent DSOs is just 34, 
which does not allow the estimation of their effect with much precision. 
 
Column 3 also shows that the effect of Tenders on Compliance was not due just to 
more contracts being awarded to DSOs at lower values of Tenders. The coefficient on 
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Tenders remains negative and statistically significant at the 5% level with a value of   
-0.026. 
 
Column 4 then estimates a quadratic relationship between Compliance and Tenders, 
to account for the change in trend seen in table 4. As expected, the signs of the 
coefficients indicate an inverted-U shape but the coefficient on the quadratic term is 
not statistically significant even at the 10 % level. The very few observations with 
more than 10 tenders do not allow us to definitely conclude about the shape of the 
relationship at these values.  
 
One may also consider that the relatively few observations with more than 10 tenders 
are having an exaggerated effect on the relationship we are trying to estimate. Column 
5 re-estimates a linear relationship limiting the sample to contracts with up to 10 
tenders. The coefficient on tenders is considerably larger than in our previous 
regressions with all controls (-0.041 as opposed to -0.026) and statistically significant 
at the 5% level. Since the range of 1 to 10 tenders appears to be the most relevant for 
policy analysis, we may regard this larger effect as a more appropriate estimate of the 
effect of competition on compliance5. 
 
To conclude the discussion of our baseline results we turn to those variables whose 
estimated coefficients have not been reported for conciseness. Time dummies are not 
statistically significant in any regression, and an F-test cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that all their coefficients are equal. The region dummies report that 
Northern England and the East Midlands have a consistently worse record in terms of 
compliance, while the effect is not statistically significant for all other regions.  
 
Our central hypothesis is so far validated since the coefficient of tenders is always 
negative and statistically significant6. 
 
Ordered probit regressions 
                                                 
5 Table 4 may also suggest the existence of a quadratic relationship in the sample with 10 or less 
tenders. We tested for this possibility and found it to be statistically non-significant.  
6 We can also report that estimating equation [1] separately for the two largest activities yields a similar 
coefficient for Tenders as we have obtained in the full sample (-0.024 for Ground maintenance and       
-0.030 for Building cleaning, to compare with -0.026 in the full sample). However, these coefficients 
do not reach standard levels of statistical significance due to the reduced number of observations. 
 27 
 
Because our measure of compliance is capturing four different instances that are not 
necessarily comparable with each other in numerical terms it makes sense to treat this 
variable as purely ordinal. An ordered probit methodology allows us to estimate the 
probability of observing each of the four possible values as a function of Tenders and 
our set of controls.  
 
Our empirical specification is thus:  
 
Prob(Compliance = 4|X) = Φ(α 1- ΓX)   [2a] 
Prob(Compliance = 3|X) = Φ(α 2- ΓX) - Φ(α 1- ΓX)  [2b] 
Prob(Compliance = 2|X) = Φ(α 3- ΓX) - Φ(α 2- ΓX)  [2c] 
Prob(Compliance = 1|X) = 1 - Φ(α 3- ΓX)   [2d] 
 
where Φ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function, X is a vector of 
controls including Tenders, and the α and Γ are parameters to be estimated. We expect 
a negative value for the coefficient on Tenders, as this would signal a negative 
relationship between competition and contract compliance (though the model only 
allows us to conclude unambiguously on the effect of Tenders on the probabilities of 
the first and last value of compliance). 
 
Table 7 presents our results with ordered probit following the same pattern of 
included control variables as in table 6. The results are very similar: contract value is 
associated with lower compliance while contract duration is associated with more. 
Contracts given to an incumbent DSO have a better record of compliance, and the 
effect seems to derive from their informational advantage since non-incumbent DSOs 
are not more compliant than contractors. Most important, Tenders has a negative 
effect on contract compliance in all regressions and the effect is statistically 
significant in all cases at least at the 10% level. The results thus continue to be 
supportive of our thesis. We also note that the assumption of cardinality in the 
endogenous variable made previously does not appear to change the qualitative 
conclusions of the empirical exercise, an outcome that has also been reported in other 
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areas of economics using ordered dependent variables (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and 
Frijters 2004).  
 
[Insert table 7] 
 
Instrumental variables regressions 
 
Up to this point we have assumed that the regressor of interest, Tenders, is exogenous 
and thus that we can interpret our results as a causal relationship. Because the 
tendering process takes place before any compliance problems could arise, it is 
natural to start from an assumption where causality runs only from the number of 
tenders (i.e. the degree of competition) to compliance. But reverse causality is 
possible if we consider that the agents involved – contractors and client authorities - 
have an idea of the likelihood of future compliance problems and let this information 
influence their behaviour during the tendering process. The resulting endogeneity bias 
may run in either direction: our OLS estimates could be larger or smaller than the true 
causal effect.  
 
A first possibility is that potential bidders may get discouraged by contracts they 
believe are likely to be “problematic”, and would thus decide not to bid. In this case 
the likelihood of future compliance problems would have a negative effect on the 
number of tenders – resulting in an OLS estimate smaller in magnitude than the causal 
effect of competition on compliance. 
 
On the other hand, it is also plausible that the client authority desires to receive more 
bids for those contracts that it perceives as potentially problematic. The client 
authority may encourage bidding through its handling of the bidding process. In this 
case the likelihood of future compliance problems would have a positive effect on the 
number of tenders – resulting in an OLS estimate of larger magnitude than the causal 
effect of competition on compliance.  
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We address these concerns by estimating equation [1] using an instrumental variables 
approach, with Tenders considered endogenous. We instrument Tenders with the 
number of invitations to bid issued by the client authority7. 
 
Results are provided in table 8. While the coefficients of all control variables are very 
similar to those obtained under OLS, the coefficient of Tenders increases considerably 
in magnitude and is statistically significant at the 1% level in all but one of the 
regressions. In the linear regression with region and DSO dummies, for instance, the 
coefficient passes from -0.026 under OLS to -0.044 with IV (column 3).  
 
[Insert table 8] 
 
The last three rows of table 8 show for each regression the results of a series of 
diagnostic tests. Tests for underidentification and weak instruments are strongly 
rejected in every instance, supporting the hypothesis that invitations is a relevant 
instrument for the number of tenders. We also run a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for the 
endogeneity of Tenders, which takes as null hypothesis that Tenders is an exogenous 
variable. As it turns out, the test cannot reject the null hypothesis in all but the first of 
our regressions. Despite the important differences in point estimates mentioned above, 
the large standard errors for Tenders make it difficult to distinguish between the 
results of an OLS regression and those of an IV regression from a statistical point of 
view. This may be due to an absence of endogeneity or, alternatively, because the two 
sources of endogeneity discussed above are present and cancel each other given their 
effects in opposite direction.  
 
Our conclusion is thus that taking into account the potential endogeneity of Tenders 
does not change our conclusions: we continue to find a negative and statistically 
significant coefficient and, moreover, a standard statistical test fails to reject the 
hypothesis of this variable being exogenous.  
 
                                                 
7 As described in section 3 above, the process of tendering had several steps and we have information 
on the number of applications, completed questionnaires, and invitations to tender. We chose 
invitations as our instruments since its correlation with tenders is 0.78, much higher than 0.48 and 0.39 
for completed questionnaires and applications. Our results also hold if we use any of these two 
alternative variables as an instrument for tenders.  
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Overall, the different results presented in this section point towards an adverse effect 
of competition on contract compliance which accords with our reading of the 
theoretical literature. 
 
7 Discussion and conclusions 
 
The analysis comes up with two important results: competition reduced compliance, 
and the better recorded compliance of DSOs is likely due to the advantage of prior 
incumbency.  How robust are these conclusions and how do they relate to other 
studies?  The two results are taken in turn. 
 
The importance of competition and tenders submitted 
 
We use auction theory to predict a negative effect of competition on contract 
compliance.  Observations made elsewhere in the literature for similar contracts finds 
that the larger the number of tenders submitted the lower the price of the contract 
awarded/cost of the service provided.  Given a lower budget, the successful bidder – 
DSO or contractor – has tighter margins to operate under and is more likely to cut 
corners and subsequently to be found non-compliant by the client authority.  Applying 
this logic, this study provides further evidence from public sector procurement that 
increasing competition reduced the winning bid.   
 
We may evaluate the size of the estimated effect of competition on compliance by 
referring to the change from the statutory minimum of three tenders from contractors 
to guidance that there be between four and six whenever possible. Using our result 
from column 5 in table 6 (our baseline results), this would result in compliance falling 
by between 0.041 and 0.123 units, on a measure of compliance with a range of 3 units 
and a standard deviation of 1.06. The expected benefits from a larger number of bids 
may make this cost worth taking, but our point is that a cost in terms of reduced 
compliance was indeed in place.  
 
We are not aware of similar studies of local government.  However, recently Propper 
et al. (2008) found, as they had expected, rather similar results for hospital services, 
though in their study the failure was quite specific: namely, competition raised 
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mortality rates for emergency admissions for acute myocardial infarction.   The basis 
of their hypothesis is, however, different.  In common with auction theory, they 
recognised hospitals facing competition had to work to tighter budgets.  Their 
additional point is that, where performance of some particular activity is not observed, 
tight budgets are likely to penalise that activity; and this is what happened for acute 
myocardial infarction.  In contrast, waiting time for all elective conditions, which had 
been a public concern over the same period, fell at hospitals faced by competitive 
pressure.  On balance the authors felt the gain in reduced waiting time was 
insufficient to offset the higher mortality rate and to that extent, and as in this study, 
competition was at the cost of quality. 
 
The importance of asymmetric information and DSO compliance 
 
Auction theory predicts that incumbents – whether DSOs or contractors - have an 
information advantage over other potential competitors.  We use this insight to 
understand whether the recorded better performance of DSOs has this explanation.  
We noted above in section 2 that both Walsh and Davis (1993) and Austin Mayfield 
(1997) found similar results in their respective studies of the first and second rounds 
of tendering.  Walsh and Davis tentatively suggested that this might be due to the mix 
of activities.  One result of this study, of which we can be confident, is that this 
outcome persisted even when we control for that mix. 
 
We were able to differentiate those DSOs who were incumbents (and therefore 
enjoyed an informational advantage) from those who were not. Unfortunately the 
same could not be done for contractors, so our analysis was based on the experience 
of DSOs only. We find that incumbent DSOs had a better record of compliance than 
contractors, and the effect is statistically significant at standard levels, while for non-
incumbent DSOs the effect is negative and non significant. To support the role of 
information asymmetries, however, we would need to show a difference between 
incumbent and non-incumbent DSOs. Here we find suggestive evidence but the small 
number of non-incumbent DSOs makes a conclusive answer difficult. The different 
between the coefficients of incumbent and non-incumbent DSOs is sizeable, but a 
standard test cannot reject the null hypothesis of them being equal. We are inclined to 
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argue that the difference between the two estimates is due to the information 
advantage of incumbents, but leave it to the reader to form his or her own opinion. 
 
We noted in section 4 that the 1988 legislation was silent on the monitoring of 
contracts.  It was only in 1991, with the experience of the first round of tendering, that 
the Department of the Environment guidance indicated that DSOs and contractors be 
treated equally (and that the penalties imposed be proportionate to the harm caused or 
to the cost of rectification).  The guidance may have been a response to the recorded 
greater compliance of DSOs in the first round.   
 
Austin Mayhead (1997), compares the performance of the first and second rounds at 
32 local authorities and notes some improvement for contractors (ibid, para 4.8.1).  
However, applying a chi-square test to the data (ibid, table 4.8) does not support this 
conclusion.  Furthermore, what is also clear from this source is that poorer recorded 
performance of contractors persisted into the second round.  Of course, the local 
authorities could have disregarded the Department guidance, and felt better disposed 
to their former colleagues (in the DSOs); but, as was noted above, it was common for 
there to be a ‘hard split’ between DSOs and their client authority with a weakening of 
their collegiality.  Equally, the better performance of DSOs might reflect the 
advantage of asymmetric advantage from being an incumbent.  Further work to test 
the advantage of incumbency clearly needs to be done.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The experience of CCT of local government in Britain was one where competition on 
price was a central feature of the contracting experience.  We find that the greater the 
competition for contracts, the less compliant were contractors and DSOs likely to be.  
However the impact on compliance would have been modest. 
 
During the period under study contract compliance was better by DSOs than by 
contractors.  The evidence suggests the better DSO performance was likely due to the 
information advantage of incumbents, which were typically DSOs, rather than a bias 
of authorities in favour of their DSOs.
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Table 1  
Contracts awarded and compliance question answered, 
Great Britain 1986 to 2001, five selected activities. 
Year Contracts Questionnaire  
Returns Proportion of total 
(%) 
1986 2 0 0 
1987 5 2 40 
1988 23 1 4 
1989 328 15 5 
1990 1033 85 8 
1991 724 155 21 
1992 565 170 30 
1993 608 248 41 
1994 975 386 40 
1995 736 357 49 
1996 533 226 42 
1997 445 132 30 
1998 210 46 22 
1999 111 21 19 
2000 64 6 9 
2001 2 0 0 
All years 6364 1850 29 
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Table 2  
Returns to compliance question, all available questionnaires in five selected activities. 
Answers  Description Obs. Distribution (%) 
a No problems 459 25 
b Minor warnings/notices to complete or redo work 677 36 
c Some default notices but no damages/payments 
withheld 
335 18 
d Payments withheld/other financial penalties 322 17 
e Major problems under discussion/arbitration 19 1 
f Some work removed from contract 17 1 
g Contract terminated 21 1 
a-g All contracts 1850 100 
Notes: Totals don’t add to 100 due to rounding. 
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Table 3 
Distribution of compliance by activity (in %).  
 
 Ground 
maintenance 
(n = 647) 
Building 
cleaning 
(n = 312) 
Vehicle 
maintenance 
(n = 60) 
Street 
cleaning 
(n = 154) 
Refuse 
collection 
(n = 190) 
All 5 
activities 
(n = 1363) 
Compliance       
4 27.8 12.8 56.7 27.3 23.2 24.9 
3 35.9 42.3 21.7 37.7 34.2 36.7 
2 19.3 17.0 8.3 16.9 23.7 18.6 
1 17.0 27.9 13.3 18.2 18.9 19.7 
 
Note: This table covers the 1363 observations used in our econometric analysis (contracts with data on 
compliance and number of tenders). This is a subset of the 1850 contracts with answered 
questionnaires that we referred to in table 2. 
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Figure 1 
Histogram of tenders 
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Table 4 
Average compliance by number of tenders 
 
Number of tenders Average value of 
compliance 
Observations 
1 2.75 139 
2 2.61 211 
3 2.72 272 
4 2.76 261 
5 2.75 206 
6 2.43 107 
7 2.59 66 
8 2.35 26 
9 2.12 17 
10 2.33 12 
11-13 2.56 16 
14 2.44 16 
15-32 2.93 14 
   
All obs. 2.67 1363 
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Table 5 
Summary statistics 
 
Variables N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Compliance 1363 2.67 1.06 1 4 
Tenders 1363 4.18 2.75 1 32 
Log of Contract Value 1363 12.48 1.47 7.21 16.32 
Contract Duration 1363 5.03 1.47 1 13 
Incumbent DSO dummy 1323 0.54 0.50 0 1 
Non-incumbent DSO dummy 1323 0.026 0.16 0 1 
Invitations to tender 1352 6.5 3.35 1 30 
 
Note: A small number of contracts do not have information on whether the bid was won by a DSO or 
on the number of invitations, explaining the slightly smaller number of observations for these variables.  
Thus there are eleven [=1363-1352] contracts for which we have information on the number of tenders 
but not the numbers invited to tender, and one of them 32 tenders.
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Table 6 
OLS results 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Compliance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenders -0.038 -0.030 -0.026 -0.055 -0.041 
 (0.013)** (0.012)* (0.013)* (0.024)* (0.018)* 
 
Contract Value -0.194 -0.219 -0.229 -0.232 -0.219 
 (0.021)** (0.024)** (0.023)** (0.023)** (0.024)** 
 
Contract Duration 0.11 0.075 0.069 0.068 0.085 
 (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.022)** 
 
Building cleaning  -0.316 -0.494 -0.497 -0.488 
  (0.072)** (0.071)** (0.071)** (0.072)** 
Vehicle maintenance  0.486 0.461 0.446 0.423 
  (0.142)** (0.140)** (0.141)** (0.142)** 
Street cleaning  0.087 0.094 0.091 0.07 
  -0.095 -0.093 -0.093 -0.095 
Refuse collection  0.164 0.171 0.177 0.125 
  (0.098)+ (0.097)+ (0.098)+ -0.098 
 
Incumbent DSO   0.172 0.155 0.152 
   (0.064)** (0.065)* (0.066)* 
 
Non-incumbent DSO   -0.106 -0.143 -0.168 
   -0.209 -0.207 -0.21 
 
Tenders squared    0.002  
    -0.001  
      
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Observations 1363 1363 1323 1323 1283 
R2 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.15 0.15 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by 
the signs **, *, and +. 
 
 44 
 
Table 7 
Ordered Probit results 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Compliance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenders -0.040 -0.031 -0.027 -0.068 -0.048 
 (0.014)** (0.014)* (0.015)+ (0.028)* (0.020)* 
 
Contract Value -0.218 -0.257 -0.275 -0.278 -0.264 
 (0.025)** (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.029)** (0.029)** 
 
Contract Duration 0.122 0.082 0.077 0.076 0.094 
 (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.025)** (0.025)** 
 
Building cleaning  -0.372 -0.596 -0.602 -0.592 
  (0.078)** (0.076)** (0.077)** (0.078)** 
Vehicle maintenance  0.656 0.648 0.628 0.6 
  (0.185)** (0.187)** (0.188)** (0.189)** 
Street cleaning  0.113 0.125 0.121 0.092 
  -0.104 -0.105 -0.105 -0.107 
Refuse collection  0.211 0.228 0.236 0.176 
  (0.106)* (0.108)* (0.108)* -0.109 
 
Incumbent DSO   0.183 0.161 0.156 
   (0.072)* (0.073)* (0.074)* 
 
Non-incumbent DSO   -0.175 -0.219 -0.245 
   -0.224 -0.222 -0.225 
 
Tenders squared    0.002  
    (0.001)+  
      
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Observations 1363 1363 1323 1323 1283 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by 
the signs **, *, and +. 
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Table 8 
Instrumental variables results 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Compliance 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Tenders -0.060 -0.045 -0.044 -0.043 -0.056 
 (0.015)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.051) (0.028)* 
 
Contract Value -0.202 -0.227 -0.236 -0.236 -0.223 
 (0.022)** (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** 
 
Contract Duration 0.105 0.070 0.064 0.064 0.080 
 (0.023)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** (0.024)** 
 
Building cleaning  -0.308 -0.488 -0.488 -0.485 
  (0.072)** (0.073)** (0.074)** (0.075)** 
Vehicle maintenance  0.455 0.428 0.429 0.396 
  (0.139)** (0.136)** (0.138)** (0.137)** 
Street cleaning  0.082 0.086 0.086 0.066 
  (0.092) (0.090) (0.091) (0.091) 
Refuse collection  0.196 0.202 0.201 0.155 
  (0.096)* (0.095)* (0.096)* (0.096) 
 
Incumbent DSO   0.149 0.150 0.138 
   (0.066)* (0.070)* (0.070)* 
 
Non-incumbent DSO   -0.113 -0.111 -0.179 
   (0.176) (0.187) (0.178) 
 
Tenders squared    0  
    (0.003)  
      
Time dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
Region dummies yes yes yes yes yes 
      
Observations 1352 1352 1312 1312 1272 
      
Diagnostic tests      
Underidentification 
(p-value) 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
0.0 
 
Weak instruments 1543 
 
1542 
 
1317 
 
132 
 
706 
 
Endogeneity (p-
value) 0.034 0.164 0.113 0.294 0.546 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level are indicated by 
the signs **, *, and +. The underidentification test is the Anderson LM statistic, distributed as a Chi-squared with 1 
degree of freedom. The test for weak instruments is Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic, with a critical value of 16.38 
for all columns except column 4, where the critical value is 7.03. The test for the endogeenity of Tenders is the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman Chi-squared test. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 
